

The 1987 Indonesian election in East Timor



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On 23 April 1987, the Indonesian forces of occupation conducted an illegal general election in East Timor. The election was held under the terms of Indonesian laws governing political parties, elections and the composition of the various legislative bodies - the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR or People's Representative Council) and the provincial and district assemblies (first- and second-level Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPRD-Is and DPRD-IIs).

These various laws underwent revision in a packet of five political laws adopted in 1985 which reinforced but did not fundamentally alter the laws that governed the three earlier elections held under the present regime in 1971, 1977 and 1982. These laws as they now stand permit only three political parties to participate in the elections. They are the Golkar or Functional Groups which is the government's party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or Development Unity Party, a government-enforced fusion in 1973 of several Muslim parties, and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) or Indonesian Democracy Party, also a government-enforced fusion in 1973 of several Christian and nationalist parties. In 1986, the PDI changed in character after it was rescued from extinction by a group of generals who selected its new leadership. The PDI is now a party with the political backing of the armed forces commander-in-chief, General Murdani, though not formally speaking the party of the armed forces.

Under the law governing the composition of the DPR, the DPRD-Is and the DPRD-IIs, the armed forces directly appoint representatives to sit in all these bodies, whilst members of the armed forces do not have the right to vote. The armed forces appoint one hundred members of the 500-seat DPR and a similar proportion, i.e. twenty per cent, of the members of all the lower-level assemblies.

All the political parties are required by law to adopt the state ideology of Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. All candidates of the three parties are rigorously screened by the army's security command, Kopkamtib, for their loyalty to the state.

The three Indonesian parties have no historical roots or contemporary relevance to the people of East Timor where all parties indigenous to the country, including those that favoured integration with Indonesia, were banned after Indonesia gained control.

The first election in 1982

This is the second time that the Indonesian forces of occupation have conducted general elections in East Timor. The first time was in 1982 when elections were held for four seats in the DPR and for 36 seats in the 45-seat DPRD-I, the so-called 'provincial' or first-level regional legislative assembly. No elections were held in 1982 for DPRD-IIs for the thirteen districts into which East Timor's regional administration is divided.

On that occasion, Golkar won all four seats in the DPR and all 36 seats for the political parties in the DPRD-I. The remaining nine seats in the DPRD-I were occupied by armed forces appointees.

In 1982, the elections were regarded as the first ever to have been held in East Timor. However, the government now asserts that the 1987 elections are the third to have been held in East Timor. They now claim that the first election held in East Timor was in 1976, alleging that an election preceded a meeting of a 'People's Assembly' that convened in Dili on 31 May 1976. This meeting was convened for the sole purpose of adopting a decision requesting the Indonesian Government to agree to East Timor's integration into the Republic of Indonesia. The decision was adopted unanimously. This so-called 'People's Assembly' met only once. It had never been heard of before and has

never been heard of since. The United Nations refused an invitation from the Indonesian government to observe anything connected with the alleged elections or the proceedings of the 'People's Assembly'.

No independent observers have placed any credence on Indonesia's claim that elections were held to choose the members of the 'People's Assembly'. Indeed, at the time, the writ of the Indonesian military forces occupying the country only ran in Dili and several coastal districts; elsewhere, the country was under the control of Fretilin, the resistance movement and the majority of East Timorese people were still living in these Fretilin-controlled regions.

When the 1977 elections took place in Indonesia, no elections were held in East Timor. As far as is known, the Indonesian authorities have never explained why they were unable to conduct these elections. However, it is not difficult to conclude that this was because military operations were still widespread, the security situation was still extremely unfavourable for Indonesia, and its writ was still limited to Dili, to areas along the coast and in regions close to the border with Indonesian West Timor.

Golkar's landslide victory

According to the official returns for the 1982 election in East Timor, 311,325 votes were cast. This was 101.57 per cent of the 306,507 registered voters announced prior to the election. Golkar was said to have won 309,608 votes or 99.45 per cent of the votes cast. The government claimed at the time that the very high turnout and the almost unanimous support for Golkar should be seen as proof that the people of East Timor accept integration and support the Indonesian government. The PPP received 675 votes and the PDI 1,044.

Special voting procedures

A special system of casting votes was designed for East Timor. The only other place where the same system was imposed was in West Papua (the Indonesian 'province' of Irian Jaya) where Indonesian sovereignty is also widely opposed by the population.

Normally, voters receive a voting slip for each of the assemblies being elected. The voter must pierce one of the three election symbols on the slip and place it in a single box for that particular assembly. The slips are pierced in enclosed cubicles, then folded and placed in the box. Properly supervised, this procedure safeguards the principle of free and secret elections, although both non-government parties have made numerous complaints about abuses perpetrated at all the elections held since 1965.

In East Timor and West Papua, voters are not allowed to pierce the voting slips. Instead of a single box for each assembly, there are three boxes, one for each of the parties. Voters must place their slips in the appropriate party box. The scope for abuse is therefore immeasurably greater.

In advance of the 1982 elections, election 'exercises' were held in many places to show people how to vote for the government party. In many other ways too, pressure was exerted on people to vote for Golkar.

The matter of choice between the three parties has no significance in East Timor since none of the parties is historically relevant to the East Timorese. However, since people were allowed no option on whether or not to vote, many people might have been expected to show their opposition to Indonesian rule by voting for either of the non-government parties. The fact that so few votes went this way is an indication of the degree of pressure on people to vote for Golkar, or an indication of the extent to which voting returns were rigged to produce results favourable to the government's claim of unanimous support for Golkar and hence integration.

The 1987 election

The special voting procedures were again used in 1987. In addition, the

rules regarding registration made it necessary for people to vote in their 'place of origin' which for most East Timorese was not where they were actually living because of resettlement and re-resettlement that has taken place since 1978.

Polling causes major upheaval

There are two kinds of vouchers issued to voters. C-vouchers require people to vote in their place of origin and AB-vouchers or absentee vouchers are issued to people who are away from home on business, working for the government elsewhere and so on. With the exception of Indonesians working in East Timor who received AB-vouchers, voters in East Timor were given C-vouchers but since their 'places of origin' were in places where they had previously been registered in resettlement camps, polling day was a day of major upheaval. One Jakarta newspaper reports: "Because everyone entitled to vote had to leave home for several hours, they all had to lock up their houses and take their children to the polling booths." Normal life was virtually at a standstill, with offices and markets closed. Public transport was also at a standstill which meant that many people had to cover long distances by foot, carrying food and drink with them for the long, gruelling day [Expedito Dias Ximenes in *Suara Pembaruan*, 30 April 1987].

It should be stressed that 'place of origin' does not mean what it says. The vast majority of East Timorese now living in army-controlled resettlement camps originally lived in small, isolated mountain hamlets. After they were driven down into the plains in 1978 and 1979 by massive aerial bombardment to destroy Fretilin's control of the countryside, they were forced to settle in camps. Since then there have been several waves of re-resettlement. Hence, 'place of origin' apparently refers to places where they were first registered in a resettlement camp, not where they were living on polling day.

It is not easy to understand the security justification for requiring people to travel long distances in order to vote. It appears that the over-riding factor was the rule regarding registration of voters. But it is clear that a close watch was kept on security conditions during the election. Two days before polling day, armed forces commander-in-chief General Murdani arrived in Dili with top-ranking officers to carry out a 'sidak' or 'on-the-spot inspection' to check security arrangements. The group included Lieutenant-General Edy Sudradjat, deputy chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, chief-of-staff for social and political affairs, and Major-General Rajaguguk, commander of the IXth Udayana Military Command based in Bali whose territory of command includes East Timor. Rajaguguk was military commander of East Timor in the early 1980s.

PDI given a boost

As in 1982, the election results in East Timor were among the first to be announced in Jakarta, showing a turnout of 362,507 votes, or 100.52 per cent of the 360,144 registered voters announced before the election:

PPP	2,654	(0.73%)
Golkar	339,231	(93.7%)
PDI	20,136	(5.57%)

The excess of votes obliged the Interior Minister, General Rustam Soepardjo to deny suspicions of foul play in the vote counting. He claimed that the excess was due to the number of Indonesian sailors, civil servants and construction workers in East Timor at the time [Jakarta Post, 27 April]. He made no attempt to explain why, in four regencies, in Dili and three inland regions, the turnout was well above one hundred per cent, with a turnout of no less than 327.26 per cent in Aileu [The Guardian, 28 April].

These oddities apart, the regime was happy with the results. The governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao used the twenty-fold increase in the PDI's votes over its poll in 1982 as proof that the elections were free:

"The two (sic) previous elections were considered by the international world, especially the countries that side with Portugal, as not being an expression of the wishes of the East Timorese people themselves. This is especially so of the 1982 election when Golkar received 99.45 per cent of the votes cast. Therefore, now that the PDI has succeeded in getting 20,163 votes in this year's election, the international world can see that there was freedom for the East Timorese people to cast their votes" [Kompas, 27 April].

The big increase in votes for the PDI has nothing to do with 'free choice'. It can be explained primarily by the support being given to this party by General Murdani. The *Suara Pembaruan* report of 30 April explains that the PDI began to campaign long before the elections, whilst Golkar was active only during election time. This is an indication of the special efforts made by the armed forces to encourage the PDI, for it is normally only Golkar that can cheat by campaigning well in advance of the three weeks officially allowed for campaigning.

The manipulated returns however had to avoid the pitfall of cutting too deep into the Golkar vote. A high anti-Golkar vote might have been interpreted abroad as a rejection of integration. The five per cent share for the PDI was apparently also intended as a warning to Indonesian bureaucrats whose performance in East Timor is often criticised as woeful.

East Timor's special candidate

The main candidate on the Golkar list for East Timor was Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the Indonesian Foreign Minister. As Golkar candidate, Mochtar led a party of foreign diplomats and journalists on a three-day visit to East Timor for a road-show which included rock groups, marching bands, hundreds of whooping Timorese horsemen and traditional dancers among whom were Balinese dancers provided by the transmigrant Balinese communities now in East Timor. A high turnout, Mochtar said, would mean it could no longer be denied "that East Timor is part of the big family of the Republic of Indonesia" [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April].

Many ambassadors in Jakarta had been invited to accompany Foreign Minister Mochtar but most refused as they felt it would be diplomatically embarrassing to be supporting the minister as a Golkar candidate [Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 April 1987]. The Canadian, Nigerian and East German ambassadors agreed to go but the Canadian ambassador later complained of being used by Golkar: "I did feel like I was being used. I only agreed to join this trip if my name and position was not mentioned, because it's standard diplomatic procedure that ambassadors do not get involved in domestic politics" [Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April].

Election used to back integration claim

Whilst the Indonesian authorities repeatedly insist that there is no question of holding a referendum to test opinion on East Timor's future, they nevertheless use the elections as if they are a test of opinion. Thus while the governor, Mario Carrascalao denied that the 1987 could be regarded as a referendum on self-determination [Jakarta Post, 9 March 1987], Ali Alatas, Indonesian ambassador to the UN, said that the election "will again prove that the East Timorese have recognised the fact" that they are also part of Indonesia [Jakarta Post, 11 February 1987].

As Portugal's Prime Minister said shortly before polling day in East Timor: "We cannot accept these elections. They are pre-prepared: we know the result in advance" [SMH, 17 April]. Speaking at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February 1987, the Portuguese ambassador said that Indonesia was only able to conduct elections thanks only to its military occupation of the country. The elections have nothing whatever to do with the exercise of the right to choose by the people of East Timor, he said.

In a document to be published in June 1987, the UK Parliamentary Human

Rights Group says that Indonesia points to East Timor's participation in Indonesian elections as evidence that the people of East Timor have accepted the Indonesian presence in their country. The PHRG rightly insists that "having illegally invaded and annexed East Timor, Indonesia cannot subsequently validate its illegal acquisition merely by conducting elections. In this sense, whether the elections are free or not is entirely irrelevant".

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